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I.

Introduction

The Executive Order that created the Commission charges
it with, among other tasks, "investigat[ing] weaknesses in
existing laws, regulations and procedures regarding the selection
of judges and ... determin[ing] whether such weaknesses create an
undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence
or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of
government."

No task of this Commission is more important.

Judges, as the personal embodiment of our American ideal of
justice, occupy a unique place in our system of government and
must be held to the highest standards of skill, independence,
honesty and fairness.

The Commission has found that New York State fails to
choose its judges in the manner that best fosters the presence of
these attributes on the bench.
selection

Indeed, some methods of judicial

namely, judicial elections

are so captive to the

interests of political party organizations that they clash with
the ideal of an independent and nonpartisan judiciary.

By

subordinating judicial values to political favoritism and party
loyalty, judicial elections invite undue influence over judges
and threaten public confidence in the integrity of the judicial
system.

Appointive as well as elective systems exist in New
York State.

Judges on our highest court -- the Court of Appeals
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-- are appointed by the executive branch, as are judges on the
Court of Claims, Criminal Court and, in New York City only,
Family Court.

In contrast, judges are elected to New York's

court of general jurisdiction -- the Supreme Court -- as well as
to the surrogate's, County, City, District, Civil and, outside of
New York City, Family Courts.

Furthermore, the laws provide a

variety of methods both for appointing and for electing judges.

Recognizing this complexity, the Commission has
conducted an extensive investigation and study of judicial
selection in New York State.

We have interviewed approximately

50 sitting and former judges around the state, and more than 60
experts, political figures, spokespersons for various organizations concerned with judicial selection and other individuals
acquainted with the selection of judges in various parts of the
state. 1

The Commission also has subpoenaed or otherwise

obtained relevant documents from different political organizations, from the New York State Board of Elections, and from
various county Boards of Election.

Finally, on March 3 and

March 9, 1988, the Commission held public hearings concerning
issues raised in the course of this investigation.

lA number of individuals who provided information,
including judges, asked that they not be publicly identified by
the Commission. Still other individuals, including judges,
declined to speak with us at all. For the sake of uniform
treatment, an individual will not be identified by name in this
report unless he or she gave public testimony before the Commission.
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Our investigation has shown that the election of
Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of limited
jurisdiction2 is so intertwined with party politics that the
process violates two principles basic to our ideal of an
independent judiciary.

First, a method of judicial selection

should protect the judiciary as much as possible from pressures
and concerns that may detract from the ability to be fair and
impartial.

The concern here is not only undue influence but the

appearance of undue influence and its effect on public
confidence.

As Chief Judge Sol Wachtler testified at our

hearings, "the whole justice system is balanced very delicately
on what we call public trust. 11 3

The elective processes threaten

this delicate balance by exposing judges, even after they have
won party support, to political pressure arising from the need to
maintain the favor of the party organizations that sponsored
them.

Even when judges resist this pressure, it places judicial

independence in jeopardy.

2By "courts of limited jurisdiction," we refer to the Court
of Claims and to Surrogate's, County, City, District, Civil,
Criminal and Family Courts. We do not consider in this report
Town and Village Justices or Justices of the Peace.
3I Tr. at 35.
In this report, "I Tr." or "II Tr." refers to
the transcript for the first or second day of the public
hearings, respectively, followed by the page of the transcript.
A list of all persons who testified or submitted written
statements at the hearings is attached as Appendix A.
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Second, a method of selecting judges should guarantee
that the broadest possible pool of qualified candidates be
considered for judgeships, without regard to political party
support.

Adherence to this principle not only ensures that

candidates are treated fairly but also encourages the best
potential judges to come forward and promotes their maximum
representation on the bench.

Elective systems, however, in

granting control over judgeships to political party leaders in
the various parts of the state, have made service and influence
within party organizations usually a prerequisite to obtaining a
judgeship.

These systems unquestionably have produced many fine

judges in our state's history.

But the fact remains that

candidates who lack a political connection, no matter how
impressive their credentials, are usually excluded from
consideration.

Our investigation further persuades us that these
defects in elective systems stem, not from individual abuses or
unusual local circumstances, but from the inherently partisan
nature of political party activity.

While party control may be

appropriate in the case of election to offices within the
legislative or executive branches, in the case of judicial
elections such control undermines the moral foundation of the
judiciary by threatening its independence and nonpartisanship.
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Appointive systems, by contrast, while also vulnerable
to partisan politics, can be carefully designed to minimize the
risks that politics poses to judicial independence and to fair
access to the bench.

For example, judicial nominating

commissions, by nominating for possible appointment to the bench
only a small number of candidates found to be well-qualified, can
limit the executive's discretion over appointments and thus the
role of partisan politics at the executive level.

Moreover, if

each nominating commission itself is nonpartisan or multipartisan and reflects a broad spectrum of community interests,
then nominations are more likely to represent a genuine consensus
of informed opinions rather than the will of a political leader
or faction.

In these and other ways, a well-designed appointive

process can free sitting judges from at least those pressures
that stem from dependence on political leaders.

For these reasons, the Commission recommends abolition
of the elective systems for selecting Supreme Court justices and
judges of courts of limited jurisdiction in favor of an
appointive system.

The appointive process we recommend should

have the following features:
1.

Nominating commissions should be established in

each judicial district for Supreme Court nominations and in the
appropriate geographical area for nominations to courts of
limited jurisdiction.
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2.

The members of each nominating commission should

be selected by a range of government authorities, including the
Governor, the four majority and minority leaders of the New York
State Senate and Assembly, the Chief Judge of New York State and
the Presiding Justice of the relevant Appellate Division, and
local authorities such as relevant mayors and county executives.
3.

These authorities should strive to achieve as

broad a range of community representation on the commission as
possible.

To that end, limits should be set on the number of

commission members who may belong to any one political party and
who may be members of the bar.
4.

Each nominating commission, after actively

recruiting and thoroughly scrutinizing judicial candidates
pursuant to written, uniform procedures, should nominate for each
vacancy a small number of candidates found well-qualified by a
majority of the commission members.
5.

The executive vested with the authority to appoint

judges from among these nominees should vary depending on the
nature and jurisdiction of the court.

The Governor, subject to

confirmation by the State Senate, should appoint nominees to the
Supreme Court, the Court of Claims and the Surrogate's Court.
the case of the other courts, the relevant county executive or
mayor should make the appointments.
6.

The re-appointment of an incumbent judge should

follow the same process within the nominating commission.

The

In
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commission members must decide by majority vote whether the
incumbent is qualified to serve another term.

If so, re-

appointment by the relevant executive should be automatic.
7.

Finally, each nominating commission should be

required to compile and make publicly available certain
statistical information on applicants, nominees and appointees,
including information on the numbers of minority group and
female applicants, nominees and appointees.

In urging these recommendations, we do not suggest that
an appointive system necessarily produces more qualified judges
or fewer corrupt ones.

We have found no persuasive evidence

correlating systems of judicial selection with the quality and
integrity of judges.

Nor do we believe that politics can be

banished completely from the selection of judges.

What our

investigation has shown is that elective systems are so infused
with party politics that they do not and cannot protect the
independence of the judiciary and promote the

broad~st

possible

access to the bench, and that the threat to public confidence
alone requires New York State to adopt less partisan
alternatives.
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II.

Elective Systems

This section provides, first, a brief overview of
elective systems; second, a description and criticism of elective
systems; third, a consideration of the most common arguments
raised in favor of elective systems; and finally, our conclusions
regarding these systems.

A.

Overview
Judges in New York State are elected through one of two

processes:

a judicial nominating convention process, in the case

of Supreme Court justices, or a primary process, in the case of
judges of some courts of limited jurisdiction.

These processes

must be repeated for each judicial seat at the end of a fixed
term, which is 14 years in the case of the Supreme Court and
varies from four to 14 years for the other elective judgeships.

Under the judicial nominating convention system,
judicial candidates for each party are nominated by a vote of
party delegates at a judicial convention.

Each party holds its

own nominating convention within each of the eleven judicial
districts throughout the state.

Party delegates are elected in

primary elections preceding the nominating convention.

Delegates

in each district are not legally obligated to vote for any
particular nominees.

However, they may only elect as many
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nominees as there are Supreme Court vacancies.4

Independents

can run for Supreme Court without party nomination, but they must
comply with special petition requirements of the New York
Election Law.5

Under the primary system, candidates for judicial
office who desire to enter a party primary must garner a
specified number of petition signatures from members of that
party in their locale (although the candidates themselves need
not be a member of that party), and otherwise comply with the
petition requirements of the New York Election Law.

Only those

candidates who satisfy these requirements may appear on the
ballot on primary day.6

Typically, one or more candidates from

within this group, corresponding to the number of court
vacancies, carry the official designation of the party.

On

primary day, voters from each party choose from among the
candidates from their party, thus narrowing the field of
candidates from each party to the number of judicial seats
available.7

4 see N.Y. Elec. Law sections 6-124 and 6-126 (McKinney 1978

& Supp. 1988).
5see id. at sections 6-138, 6-140 and 6-142.
6 see, ~' id. at sections 6-118 and 6-136.
7see id. at section 6-160.
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B.

Description And Critique Of Judicial Elections
Two telling facts emerge from the Commission's

investigation into judicial elections:

first, the choice of

candidates usually rests with local party leaders who base their
decisions in large part on political considerations; second, the
party system exposes candidates to political pressures even after
they have been nominated or designated for office.

1.

Queens County As An Illustration
In its investigation, the Commission found that the

elective systems in Queens County illustrate clearly the conflict
between party politics and judicial values.

Consequently, in

this report we describe in detail the Queens systems as they
have operated over the past ten to 15 years.

In so doing, we do

not mean to single out the practices in that county.

Indeed, our

investigation shows that the elective processes in Queens are in
important ways representative of those in other areas of the
state.

Queens County politics is dominated by the Democratic
Party, officially represented in Queens by the Queens Democratic
Organization ("QDO").

The Democratic county leader in Queens

(the chairman of the QDO) and important district leaders (heads
of local Democratic organizations who sit on the Executive
Committee of the QDO) control access to positions on both Supreme

Judicial Selection Report
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Court and Civil Court.8

The district leaders refer the names of

potential candidates to the county leader, who sends all names to
the Queens County Bar Association and, at times in the past, to a
screening panel established by the QDO.

Then, after negotiations

and discussions with district leaders, the county leader and his
aides pare down the list of candidates found qualified.

In the

case of Civil Court candidates, the QDO Executive Committee
eventually ratifies the county leader's choices of party
designees.

In the case of Supreme Court candidates, the

political leadership reaches an informal ·agreement on the party's
nominees before the nominating convention.

After the QDO

officially designates and nominates its candidates, the
organization assists in the petition process and the election
campaigns.

In Queens, the official support of the Democratic
Party almost always assures election.

None of the many persons

with whom we spoke could recall any instance since the mid-1970's
when a Supreme Court candidate backed by the QDO was not
nominated at the convention.

And only on a handful of occasions

in the last 15 years has a candidate designated by the QDO
failed to win the Civil Court Democratic primary.

Success in the

Democratic primary or at the Democratic convention has been and

Bcivil Court positions are the only judgeships in Queens
obtainable through the primary process.
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still is "tantamount to election. 11 9

In New York State there are, of course, variations in
elective processes from place to place.

At least two kinds of

variations are significant and should be explained here.

First,

in some jurisdictions, such as New York County, political party
structure is not as monolithic as it is in Queens, but rather is
divided into competing factions.

As a result, in these areas

political control over the primary designation and judicial
nominating convention processes may be less centralized than it
is in Queens.

Whereas in Queens the county leader can usually

rely on unanimity within his organization by the time the party
designates or nominates its candidates, in other areas two or
more factions may vie to designate or nominate their candidates.
Second, in some jurisdictions, no one political party
predominates to the degree that the Democratic Party does in
Queens.

To the extent there is real competition between parties,

general elections are more closely contested and perhaps more
closely followed by the voting public.

These variations, however, do not alter our fundamental
conclusion that the state's elective systems as a whole fail to
protect judicial independence and to promote the broadest
possible access to the bench.
9r Tr. at 111 (Weprin).

Relatively decentralized
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management of the primary and convention processes, for example,
may affect the type of political control exerted over judgeships
but it does not lessen the relevance of political connections to
judicial selection or reduce political pressures on party
designees.

And contested elections, while arguably a gain for

democracy, pose other threats to judicial independence by
compelling some judicial candidates to raise large sums of
campaign money or to become dependent on the resources of
political organizations.
2.

Elective Systems Fail To Assure All Qualified
Candidates Access To The Bench
a.

Political Control Over Elective Systems
Closes Nominating Conventions And, To A
Lesser Extent, Primaries To Candidates
Who Lack Party Organization Backing

In virtually every county in the state, the party
nomination for Supreme Court is in the hands of a small group of
political leaders, typically the county leader, other top
officials of his or her organization, and local political figures
with sufficient power to make claims upon the county
organization.

And in most counties, these same leaders exercise

similar control over the party designation for judicial
primaries.

Political party control over judicial elections is

most clearly revealed at the Supreme Court nominating convention.
The convention, as Assemblyman and Queens District Leader Saul
Weprin testified at our public hearings, "really operates as a
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rubber stamp of the county leader. 11 10

In Queens, the convention delegates are invariably
hand-picked by the district leaders and usually elected unopposed
on party slates.
..,

Accordingly, the delegates need little

persuasion to do the leaders' bidding.

Indeed, the

organization's choices are nominated routinely because the
conventions are "pretty well-orchestrated," with "scripts"
supplied beforehand to the delegates.11

One individual who served for several years as a
delegate at the Queens judicial convention told us that,
typically, he and other delegates would not receive notification
of their election as delegates from the Board of Elections until
just before the nominating convention.

Thus, he attended the

conventions without advance knowledge of the candidates.

He also

confirmed that a pre-set script determined the course of the
convention.

.

According to this former delegate, the delegates

were well aware that the county leader chose the nominees prior
to the nominating convention.

Only after the nominations, in the

experience of this former delegate, were delegates afforded the
opportunity to meet the candidates.

lOI Tr. at 105-106.
llI Tr. at 107 (Weprin).
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The QDO's success in the primary elections for Civil
Court seats, while not as complete as in the Supreme Court
nominating conventions, also testifies to its power over the
judicial selection process.

QDO-backed civil Court candidates

have available to them the resources of the QDO and the local
Democratic clubs.

Club workers collect signatures, prepare the

petitions, litigate petition challenges, and distribute campaign
literature.

Candidates backed by the organization also carry the

official designation of the Democratic Party.

These advantages

are particularly telling in judicial elections, in which voter
knowledge of individual candidates is often quite limited and
voters more often than not vote according to party labels.12

Those few independent Democrats who win judicial
primaries against QDO-backed candidates sometimes pay a price.
One such individual who won election to Civil Court has spent
many years there, despite both his proclaimed desire to join the
Supreme Court bench and the ascendancy of many other Civil Court
judges with fewer years of judicial experience.

Since his

election to Civil Court, the judge has attempted to win the
organization's good graces by hiring QDO-recommended law
secretaries.

He told us this was "part of making the peace.

You

don't want to make enemies with people who determine whether you

1 2 see the discussion of voter participation in judicial
elections at pp. 36-41 below.
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get redesignated."

The political realities of the nominating convention
are not affected by variations in political conditions throughout
the state.

Even in locales with a less unified party structure

than exists in Queens, candidates must still obtain the support
of party leaders who control blocs of delegates.

In the Bronx,

where the Democratic organization has been in disarray, Justice
Frank Torres won election to the Supreme Court as the Democratic
nominee in 1987.

Justice Torres testified at the Commission's

public hearings that, after years of being absent from politics,
he was compelled "to make the political connections to influence
those that you recognize are key towards the development of
support at the Judicial Convention. 11 13

Even when a script does

not control the course of the convention, the fact remains that,
in Justice Torres' words, "there are a few dozen key people who
control [the] delegates and who control the outcome of the
convention. 1114

Two additional examples from our hearings make the same
point.

Court of Claims Judge Joan Carey testified to her

repeated frustration in seeking a Supreme Court nomination at
several judicial conventions in New York County.
13rr Tr. at 142.

14rr Tr. at 145.

Despite her
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high rating from the local Democratic screening panel and her
attempts to discuss substantive issues such as court reform with
convention delegates, she found them unwilling or unable to
address her candidacy on the merits.

She testified that "there

is no way in which ... a delegate really examines the
qualifications of the particular candidate," and indeed the
results of all but one of the four conventions she attended were
determined in advance.15

Justice David Levy of the Bronx told an even more
striking story of convention politics.

In 1979, Justice Levy, a

reform Democratic candidate, was denied nomination by one vote
after eleventh-hour lobbying by Democratic politicians in the
Bronx and Manhattan16 caused even sympathetic district leaders to
desert him.

In the next year, 1980, Justice Levy was excluded

from meaningful consideration because the Bronx Democratic
organization and Manhattan reformers struck a deal in which the
two groups divided between themselves the two vacant Supreme
Court seats, thus shutting out Justice Levy and other Bronx
reformers.

Finally, in 1981, Justice Levy easily obtained the

nomination after using the political power of his reform group to
reach an accommodation with Bronx Democratic leader Stanley
15I Tr. at 185-95, 214.
16 until 1981, the Bronx and Manhattan comprised a single
judicial district and consequently judicial nominating
conventions included delegates from each borough.
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Friedman.

Justice Levy stated that in each of these years the

pivotal factor at the convention was a political "deal" of some
kind. 17

In the upstate judicial districts as well, the
nominating convention fits Assemblyman Weprin's description of a
"rubber stamp."

Delegates are selected by and loyal to county

leaders, and as a result the nomination process usually proceeds
without debate.

Similarly, party designees upstate usually run

unopposed within the party and therefore do not have primary
races.

Many knowledgeable people mentioned the time and expense

of campaigning without party organization support as one reason
for the absence of primary competition in upstate counties.

b.

Political Service And Influence In
The Party Organization Is Almost
Always A Prerequisite To Receiving The
Organization's Support

For party leaders, the tremendous power they exercise
over judgeships is first and foremost a political asset, not a
public trust.

As Chief Judge Wachtler observed at the public

hearings, "[n)o political leader has been given the mandate to
improve the judiciary, and that really isn't on the political
leader's agenda. 11 18

Queens illustrates three aspects concerning

17II Tr. at 52-66, 82-88.
18 I Tr. at 34.
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this agenda:

first, past political service to a local club or

the county organization is of paramount importance in the
selection of judges; second, in the discussions leading to the
selection of the party organization's candidates, political
leaders often bargain over judgeships; and third, there is no
assurance that political leaders will select the most qualified
judicial candidates.

(i)

The Importance Of Political Service

Local Democratic Party clubs are the basic building
blocks of the QDO because they serve as the power base of the
district leaders who comprise its leadership.

As Queens District

Leader Archie Spigner stated at our hearings, district leaders
have a family, and that's a clubhouse .... [T]hey
have a clubhouse which they have to respond to,
and you just can't maintain the support of your
club if you do not reward ... the club ....
[District leaders are) not very successful if
[they] don't have a clubi because ... that's your
family, your supporters. 9
Almost all t he Democratic judges in Queens whom we
interviewed were members of local Democratic clubs prior to
becoming judges.

Through these clubs many performed services for

the party, such as gathering signatures for petitions,
distributing campaign literature and volunteering legal
assistance in election cases .

19rr Tr. at 1 65-66.

We learned from several witnesses
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that district leaders almost invariably choose to support
judicial candidates who have been active in their clubs or who
have been recommended by others who were active.

The preferences

of the county leader, too, are based largely on a person's past
assistance to the party.

Moreover, the right political affiliation may enable a
judge to rise to higher judicial office more swiftly.

For

example, Justice Nat Hentel was a Republican when he was elected
to the Queens Civil Court, where he remained for 18 years.

After

15 years on that bench, Justice Hentel became a Democrat; three
years later, he won the party's nomination to the Supreme Court.
Justice Hentel testified that many Democratic Civil Court judges
junior to him were nominated to Supreme Court ahead of him
because "they were active in the community and were active in the
political life of the community before they went on the bench. 11 20

Assemblyman Weprin succinctly summarized the current
system in Queens:
The person who is active in the
political process will certainly have a
much better chance to be designated, and
many people who probably would be very
capable judges are probably ruled out of
the system that way.21
20rr Tr. at 18-19.
21r Tr. at 120.
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Assemblyman Weprin also testified that "being active in civics,
politics, community organizations, religious organizations [has)
something to do with being a good judge. 11 22 Yet other wellqualified, civic-minded individuals who choose not to serve the
Democratic organization or local clubs are by that fact excluded
from consideration for judgeships.

(ii)

The Role Of Political Bargaining

The process by which the Queens county leader and
district leaders reach agreement on the party's candidates is
one of bald political bargaining.

Since the QDO chairman is

elected by the district leaders and needs their support, he has a
strong interest in keeping as many of them as happy as possible.
This is no less true for the allocation of judgeships than the
allocation of other political benefits.

Councilman Spigner

characterized the process as:
balancing the equities .... (A] County Leader
... has to have the support of the majority
of the 64 [district) leaders to get elected,
so in order for him to maintain his support
system, he has got to satisfy ... the
majority of the leaders.
By the same token, according to Councilman Spigner, a district
leader will "withdraw" his or her candidate ''in the interest of
harmony" when he or she sees that "it's not my turn. 11 23
22r Tr. at 124.
23rr Tr. at 167-68, 173.
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process, in essence, is one of mutual accommodation to political
power.

As Councilman Spigner testified, the selection process

works the same "whether it be for judgeships or for legislative
posts."24

Queens judges themselves have characterized their
election in terms of political trading.

In one case, a judge

told us in substance that he believed his nomination was a
political favor from the county leader to the judge's district
leader.

Judges also spoke of their chances in terms of whether

it was their "turn" to get "the nod", that is, the designation or
nomination.

One judge told us that "my time had come.

I had

been passed over again and again, and I had been a good boy."

(iii) The Lack Of Assurance That The Most
Qualified Candidates Will Be Endorsed
This emphasis upon political criteria provides no
assurance that political leaders will endorse the most qualified
candidates, even from among those who have been politically
active.

Councilman Spigner, for example, explained at the

hearings how he determines which candidates to sponsor for
judgeships in Queens:
(I]t's based on friendships,
relationships built up over the years.
For example, there's a young man that
goes to my Church who has been -- I've
24rr Tr. at 162.

Judicial Selection Report
May 19, 1988
Page 23
known him since he was a Little Leaguer,
so now he's a lawyer, and he also
belongs to my political club, and I sort
of look to the day when I will be able
to nominate him for a judgeship, you
know. So that's a particular personal
relationship.
If you run out of
friends, then you look to see other
considerations .... Obviously, the only
requirements that I know of for being a
judge ... is having been admitted for
ten years, and I don't even know of any
other objective test besides that.
I
don't know of any other official
requirement
So if you have been
admitted to practice and you are
without any experiences of a negative
nature, I assume that on the face of it,
that qualifies you to become a judge.25
Councilman Spigner later added, "I certainly would not nominate
anyone who would be an embarrassment or had displayed tendencies
or who was inarticulate or who did not have the respect of his
colleagues. 11 26

The essentially political nature of these deliberations
is not unique to Queens.

To the extent that party leaders

control access to elective processes and outcomes at the
conventions or primaries, political considerations such as party
service and clout within the organization will loom large in the
selection of judges.

And screening committees, where they do

exist, as in Queens, do not offset the influence of partisan
politics.

At best, they help ensure that the party endorses

25rr Tr. at 163-64; see also I Tr. at 98 (Weprin).
26rr Tr. at 178.
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judges who are qualified as well as politically connected, not
that candidates who are qualified but lack political connections
are also seriously considered.

Furthermore, at present no

statute or rule prevents the county leader from simply refusing
to abide by the decisions of the screening committee and
supporting candidates found to be unqualified.

c.

Even The Renomination Of A Sitting
Judge Can Be Subject To Politics

One of the most striking problems with elective systems
is that demonstrably well-qualified judges can be denied
renomination at the end of their terms because of the whims of
political leaders.

While many party organizations, including the

QDO, have adopted the practice of supporting the renomination of
any judicial incumbent who has demonstrated basic competence, no
law or regulation prevents this custom from being breached.
Thus, in the words of Chief Judge Wachtler, an incumbent judge is
"entirely at the mercy of a political process that may give
little or no regard to his or her demonstrated capacity to
serve, 11 27 as several dramatic examples in recent years
illustrate.

In 1983, the Bronx Democratic organization denied
Justice Donald Sullivan renomination, despite his excellent

27r Tr. at 16.
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reputation as a judge and the conclusion by various bar
associations that he was qualified.

Former Justice Sullivan

testified that when he called Stanley Friedman, the county
leader, for an explanation, he was simply told that "political
considerations" precluded his renomination.28

Similarly, Judge Stuart Namm testified that the
dominant Suffolk County Republican Party refused to endorse his
re-election to District Court in 1981, in effect condemning him
to defeat, even though he had received the highest rating from
the Suffolk County Bar Association.

Judge Namm explained that

the Republican Party refused to endorse him because he was a
Democrat.

Two years later a similar fate befell Leon Lazer, a

well-respected Supreme Court Justice in Suffolk County, when the
Republican organization in Suffolk County decided for political
reasons to end the practice of cross-endorsing incumbent judges
who were Democrats.29

Moreover, since 1984 the Republican Party

in Nassau County has also declined to cross-endorse Democratic
judges, with the result that at least five sitting judges in
County, District and Family Courts have failed to win reelection.

28I Tr. at 156, 173.
29I Tr. at 126 (Weprin); II Tr. at 205-09 (Namm).
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Incumbent judges are no more secure upstate, even in
judicial districts with informal traditions of crossendorsements.

In recent years, sitting judges with fine records

in at least two such districts -- the Seventh and the Eighth
have been denied politically important cross-endorsements,
although in many cases the affected judge still won re-election.

such patently partisan behavior deprives the judicial
system of the services of not only sitting judges but also
potential candidates for judicial office.

As Chief Judge

Wachtler observed at our public hearings, "[c]apable candidates
for judicial office may be discouraged from seeking such office,
knowing that periodically they must contend with the
vicissitude[s] of the partisan political process in order to
remain in office. 11 30

3.

Elective Systems Also Expose Judges To Political
Pressures Even After They Obtain Party Support
Our investigation has revealed a number of ways in

which pressure on judges to maintain the favor of the party,
whether to assure support for another term or merely to show
loyalty, can threaten judicial independence.

30I Tr. at 16-17.
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a.

Judges May Feel Obligated To Contribute
To Local Political Organizations

By law, judicial candidates are prohibited from making
any contribution, directly or indirectly, in connection with an
election or nomination for election. 3 1

However, judges who are

announced candidates for another elective judicial office are
permitted by an Office of Court Administration (''OCA") rule to
purchase "a ticket to a politically sponsored dinner or other
affair" from nine months before the primary or nominating
convention until six months after the general election. 32

This

31see N.Y. Elec. Law, supra, sections 17-162 and 14-100.
32Rules Of The Chief Administrator Of Courts, Section 100.7,
22 N.Y.C.R.R. Section 100.7 (1986), states as follows:
No judge during a term of off ice shall hold any office in
a political party or organization or contribute to any political
party or political campaign or take part in any political
campaign except his or her own campaign for elective judicial
office.
Political activity prohibited by this section includes:
(a) The purchase, directly or indirectly, of tickets
to politically sponsored dinners or other affairs, or
attendance at such dinners or other affairs, including
dinners or affairs sponsored by a political organization for
a nonpolitical purpose, except as follows:
(1)
This limitation shall not apply during a
period beginning nine months before a primary election,
judicial nominating convention, party caucus or other
party meeting for nominating a candidate for elective
judicial office for which the judge is an announced
candidate, or for which a committee or other
organization has publicly solicited or supported his or
her candidacy, and ending, if the judge is a candidate
in the general election for that office, six months
after the general election.
If the judge is not a
candidate in the general election, this period shall
end on the date of the primary election, convention,
caucus or meeting.
(2)
During the period defined in paragraph (1) of
this subdivision:
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limited exemption is designed to allow judicial candidates to
contact political leaders in order to be able to compete for
political support.33

our review of documents received from the QDO as well
as from the State and New York City Boards of Elections shows,
however, that a number of Democratic judges in Queens appear to
(i)
A judge may attend a fundraising dinner
or affair on behalf of the judge's own candidacy,
but may not personally solicit contributions at
such dinner or affair.
(ii)
Notwithstanding subdivision (bl of this
section, a judge may purchase a ticket to a
politically sponsored dinner or other affair even
where the regular cost of a ticket to such dinner
or affair exceeds the proportionate cost of the
dinner or affair.
(iii) Notwithstanding subdivisions (c) and
(d) of this section, a judge may attend a
politically sponsored dinner or affair in support
of a slate of candidates, and may appear on
podiums or in photographs on political literature
with the candidates who make up that slate,
provided that the judge is part of the slate of
candidates.
(b)
Contributions, directly or indirectly, to any
political campaign for any office or for any political
activity. Where the judge is a candidate for judicial
office, reference should be made to the Election Law.
(c)
Participation, either directly or indirectly, in
any political campaign for any office, except his or her own
campaign for elective judicial office.
(d)
Being a member of or serving as an officer or
functionary of any political club or organization or being
an officer of any political party or permitting his or her
name to be used in connection with any activity of such
political party, club, or organization.
(e)
Any other activity of a partisan political nature.
(Emphasis added.)
33r Tr. at 16, 23 (Wachtler).
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have purchased more than "a ticket" to a particular event.

A

ticket to one of the several annual QDO functions has cost over
the years between $50 and $250.

Yet one Civil Court judge, for

example, spent $1,000 toward the purchase of tickets for one QDO
event during the year he was elected to Supreme Court.

In many

cases, moreover, a judge's spouse, other family members, friends
or campaign committees purchased additional tickets to QDO
affairs.

Equally noteworthy are the lengths to which some judges
have gone to purchase tickets.

Several Queens judges told us

that, every year following their election to Civil Court, they
gave official notice that they were candidates for Supreme Court
so that, as "announced candidates," they could purchase tickets
to and attend QDO functions without running afoul of the OCA
rule.

In some cases, this notice was given regardless of whether

the judges believed they would be a serious contender for a
Supreme Court nomination.

Indeed, one judge recalled contacting

someone at the QDO once and saying, "don't get angry ... I know
I'm not going to get the nomination but I'm going to send out the
J

letter to say I'm a candidate so that I can give money."

In this

fashion, the judge explained, it was possible to "keep in
contact" with the party even though the judge knew it was not yet
time to get the "nod."
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Chief Judge Wachtler testified at our hearings about
this practice, which he described as "perverse" and a "distortion
of the ethical canons."

According to the Chief Judge, "there

are judges who haven't missed a political dinner any year during
their term of office as judge. 11 34

He also pointed out that, in

order to be able to attend these dinners, judges to whom no
higher off ice is available sometimes announce their candidacies
for another vacancy for the same office.35

Leaving aside what the rules allow, extensive ticketbuying creates at least the appearance of a politically dependent
rather than an independent judiciary.

Although the judges we

interviewed denied that the QDO explicitly pressured or asked
them to purchase tickets to QDO affairs, several judges told us
they thought their purchase of tickets to QDO affairs was
"expected".

Another judge told us that "no one had to force you

to do anything."
the affairs.

He just "knew" to purchase tickets and attend

He also admitted that, had there been explicit

pressure from the organization, he would have acceded to it.
This judge also said he believed that if he did "all the required
things" while he was a Civil Court judge, he would eventually
become a Supreme Court justice.

Another judge told us that

purchasing tickets to QDO functions was "a way of saying thank
34I Tr. a 15-16; see also II Tr. at 223 (Namm).
35I Tr. at 25-26.
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you" to the party.

In fact, in many of the cases we examined,

Queens Democratic judges' contributions to the QDO through ticket
purchases peaked during the year they were elected to the Civil
or Supreme Court.

One Queens judge talked to us at length on this
subject.

He said that the QDO "wants all the people to come that

they can get to come .... (N]o one ever told me that I had to do
X, Y, or Z in that context (of obtaining a judgeship] but
certainly the word got to me that we're going to need money and
therefore you're going to need to get people to come."

The judge

said he was asked, "How many tables do you think you can sell for
us to get money?"

This same judge's campaign committee

coordinator told us that the committee gave approximately $5,000
to the QDO for the purchase of tickets because that was the
custom.

In some cases, purchases by Queens judges and their
campaign committees of tickets to QDO affairs and to political
affairs at local Democratic clubs constituted a substantial
portion of their total campaign expenditures.

For instance, the

campaign disclosure statements of one successful Supreme Court
candidate reflect that, of approximately two thousand dollars in
campaign expenditures, almost one-half was spent on the purchase
of tickets to QDO affairs and an additional 30 percent on tickets
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to local Democratic club affairs.

Thus, contributions to

fundraisers sponsored by Democratic political leaders constituted
nearly 80 percent of the judge's total campaign expenditures.

In

another instance, after a victorious Supreme Court campaign, a
Queens judge's campaign committee gave the balance of its funds
-- several thousand dollars -- to the QDO.

b.

Judges May Be Keenly Aware Of Their Re-election
Chances When Deciding Politically Sensitive Cases

Many elected judges with whom we spoke view with
trepidation the prospect of seeking political support for
renomination or redesignation at the end of their terms.

Not

only is this effort distracting and to some demeaning,36 but it
may fail.

The inherent uncertainty of winning political support

can have a chilling effect on a judge's exercise of his duties.
Justice Hentel of Queens was asked at our public hearings if he
would feel special pressure in deciding a case involving the law
partner of a political leader who could help determine his
judicial career.

Justice Hentel responded candidly:

I'm human .... I would think about it.
I would
struggle with it .... I shouldn't have to think
about it.
I shouldn't have my energies dissipated
in wondering what the reaction is going to be or
how I'm going to kill myself for the next
election.
It takes some guts, but that's the
system.
It should be changed.37

36I Tr. 192-95 (Carey); II Tr. at 146-47 (Torres).
37II Tr. at 36, 38.
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races.39

In 1980, the two most heavily financed Supreme Court

races were held in the Seventh and Eighth Districts, the only two
districts that year with competitive Supreme Court races.

In the

Seventh District, Supreme Court campaigns averaged more than
$55,000.

1

In the 1980's, these costs have skyrocketed.

Anthony

Palermo, an attorney in Rochester and Chairman of the Fourth
Department Screening Committee, testified that five years ago
Supreme Court election campaigns cost as much as $100,000 in
Rochester.40

According to Board of Elections records, in a 1986

Supreme Court race in Rensselaer County, in the Third District,
the two candidates raised and spent a combined total of more than
$140,000.

The New York Code of Judicial Conduct bars judges from
learning the identities of contributors to their campaign
committees.41

This rule, however, is unrealistic.

We learned in

our investigation that judges frequently discover the identities
of contributors through their attendance at fundraising events.
Moreover, the rule fails to address the appearance problems that
39Judicial Elections In New York, Voter Participation And
Campaign Financing Of State Supreme Court Elections 1978, 1979
and 1980, 4, 18 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1982) ("Judicial
Elections In New York 1978-1980").
40II Tr. at 255, 264.
4lsee N.Y. Code Of Jud. Conduct, Canon 7B(2) and Commentary,
N.Y. Jud. Law (McKinney 1975).
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follow from extensive fundraising by judges.

For example,

according to Mr. Palermo, judicial campaign committees in the
Seventh Judicial District sometimes seek contributions "from
those who appear before the (judges], primarily lawyers and so
forth. 11 42

In 1978 through 1980, almost 40 per cent of the

reported contributions to Supreme Court judicial campaign
committees statewide were made by lawyers.43

c.

The Arguments In Support Of Elective Systems
The proponents of judicial elections most often cite

three arguments in support of their position:

first, that the

democratic values of our government are best served by giving the
people the power to choose judges; second, that elective systems
are more sensitive than other systems to the judicial aspirations
of minority groups and women; and third, that the involvement of
judges in local party politics is on balance beneficial because
it best insures that they will know and appreciate the needs of
their community and be able to temper the law with common sense.

The Commission believes, after studying the record we
have compiled, that these arguments either lack substance or
pale beside the considerations that militate against the election
of judges.
42II Tr. at 255.
43Judicial Elections In New York 1978-1980, supra, at 4-5.
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1.

Democratic Values
The short answer to the democratic argument in favor of

electing judges is that elective processes in fact have little
to do with democracy, beyond the basic ability of the voter to
pull the lever based on party affiliation.

Moreover, the real

choice is made, not in the voting booth, but well before, in the
nominating process and in the primary designation process, and
neither of these processes is more than marginally responsive to
popular will.

Consequently, the sharp conflict that elective

systems engender between partisan politics and judicial values is
in no sense offset or justified by democratic principles.

In the nominating convention system, a few political
leaders select in advance, with little or no public input, the
candidates whom the convention will nominate.

To be sure, the

public plays a role in the election of judicial delegates, but
these delegates usually have been hand-picked by party leaders
and follow their will.

Moreover, the public has virtually no

choice of delegates since they usually run unopposed on party
slates.

Thus, conventions even in jurisdictions where party

structure is fragmented into many factions, such as New York
County, run according to the agenda of a relative few and with no
meaningful popular participation.

As Judge Carey, a candidate at

New York County conventions, testified, "there is no way in which
a delegate really examines the qualifications of the
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particular candidate."

Accordingly, there is "just no connection

[between] the citizens and the people who are running."44

Nor is democratic reform of the convention process a
realistic possibility.

As long as delegates owe their seats to

the party and not to the voters, conventions will not reflect
popular will.

In theory, contested delegate races could

democratize the conventions.

But a high percentage of contested

delegate races is unlikely for several reasons.

First, in order

to have any real voice at the convention, non-organization
candidates would have to win a large bloc of delegate seats.
Such a hurdle, combined with the time and money involved in
campaigning for election, may deter non-organization candidates
from running at all.

This analysis applies to conventions with

rival delegate blocs as well as to more monolithic conventions.

Second, voter interest in delegate races is extremely
low.

In 1983, for example, only 39 of 115 delegate races in New

York County were contested, and approximately 8,000 (two percent)
of the county's registered Democrats voted; in Brooklyn, only 12
of 140 delegate races were contested, and less than 1,000 (0.2
percent) of the registered Democrats voted; in the Bronx,
approximately half of the delegate races were contested and less
than 15,000 (eight percent) of the registered Democrats voted;
44I Tr. at 212, 214.
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and, in Suffolk and Nassau Counties, there were no contested
delegate elections in either the Democratic or the Republican
parties.45

The primary system allows only marginally more popular
participation than the convention system.

Candidates designated

by the local party organization are chosen by the same party
leaders that select Supreme Court candidates, and according to
the same criteria.

And designation usually ensures that

candidates will reach the general election, for one of two
reasons.

First, in many if not most cases there is no primary

because the designated candidate runs unopposed.

For example, no

Democratic Party primaries were held in more than 70 percent of
the New York City Civil Court elections held between 1980 and
1985.46

Similarly, between 1980 and 1985 primaries were held in

less than 30 percent of all Surrogate's Court races across the
state.

These primaries were held in only six counties:

Broome,

Dutchess, Erie, Jefferson, New York and Suffolk Counties.47

45Judicial Elections In New York, Voter Participation And
Campaign Financing Of State Supreme Court Elections 1981, 1982
and 1983, 51-52, 59, 62 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1984)
(''Judicial Elections In New York 1981-1983").
46The Illusion Of Democracy: New York City Civil Court
Elections 1980-1985, 15 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1986).
47surrogate's Court Elections In New York State 1980-1985,
10-12 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1986).
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Alternatively, when there are primary contests, party
designation is a significant asset.

It entitles the candidate to

the substantial resources -- especially assistance and advice in
the petition process and the election campaign -- that the party
organization can confer.
carries great weight.

Moreover, party designation itself

Judicial candidates are barred from

announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, 48
which makes it extremely difficult for the public to evaluate
judicial candidates except on the basis of their records.

Yet,

as Judge Carey testified, the public usually takes little
interest in judicial candidates' records and backgrounds.49

In

such circumstances, a candidate's designation as the official
candidate of the party can be decisive.

Low citizen awareness of

the issues is probably also the reason why a number of judicial
primaries appear to have been decided by such arbitrary factors
as the location of candidates' names on the ballot,50 or the
perception of a given candidate as a member of a particular
ethnic group.

Party labels, or other kinds of labels, fill the

vacuum created by voter ignorance or disinterest.

Similar factors -- uncontested races, lack of voter
participation, and dependence on party labels -- also make
48N.Y. Code Of Jud. Conduct, supra, Canon 7B(l) (c).
49I Tr. at 203-205, 213-14.
50 See,

~,

II Tr. at 49-50 (Levy).
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general elections less than meaningful exercises in democracy.
For example, in 1978 through 1983 approximately 87% of the
Supreme Court races throughout the state were either uncontested
or noncompetitive.51

The majority of these races were

uncontested or noncompetitive because of the general dominance of
one party.

But even in the Third, Seventh and Eighth Judicial

Districts, where one party is not generally dominant, only
approximately one-third of the Supreme Court races during this
period were competitive.

One reason for this low figure is that

political leaders from different parties often agree to crossendorse candidates.

In 1982, for example, all eight Supreme

Court vacancies in the Third and Eighth Districts were filled in
this manner -- the Republicans cross-endorsed four Democratic
candidates, and the Democrats cross-endorsed four Republican
candidates.52

Moreover, voter participation in judicial elections is
often extremely low.

For instance, only approximately 30 percent

of the eligible voters participated in the general elections
between 1978 and 1980 and approximately 20 percent of these
voters failed to vote for a Supreme Court candidate.53
51 Judicial Elections In New York 1981-1983, supra, at 79. A
noncompetitive race is a contested election in which the winner
obtains more than 55 percent of the vote.
Id.
52Id. at 28, 37, 79.
53Judicial Elections In New York 1978-1980, supra, at 4-5.
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Similarly, only 8.3 percent of all the Surrogate's Court
elections in New York State between 1980 and 1985 were
competitive, and roughly 18 percent of those who voted in the
general elections in those years did not vote for a Surrogate's
Court candidate.54

Finally, one example may show how dependent judicial
voting is on party labels.

In 1982, when the Manhattan

Democratic organization failed to file nominating papers for its
candidates, the voters had no Democratic endorsements to guide
them in local judicial races.

As a result, approximately 58

percent of those Manhattan voters who cast a ballot for governor
that year failed to vote for a Supreme Court candidate -- more
than twice the statewide rate of such failure.55

In short, judicial elections do not significantly
promote democratic values.

2.

Minority Representation On The Bench
The Commission shares the concern that qualified

judicial candidates who are women and members of minority groups
be fairly represented on the bench.

While some progress has been

54 surrogate's Court Elections In New York State 1980-1985,
supra, at 9, 19.
55Judicial Elections In New York 1981-83, supra, at 15, 1920, 75-76.
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made, that goal is far from being achieved in New York State.
However, there is no evidence to suggest that elective systems
are more responsive to the aspirations of underrepresented groups
than appointive systems and, indeed, there is considerable
evidence to the contrary.

At our public hearings we heard persuasive criticisms
of the elective systems in New York City on just this score.56
Justice Torres of the Bronx, for example, after noting that
Hispanic judges held only 16 out of over 500 state and federal
judgeships in New York City, told the Commission that 13 of these
16 judgeships had been attained through appointive rather than
elective processes.

Justice Torres concluded:

[I]f you analyze the extent to which
positions have been gained, essentially it
reflects the opportunity presented by the
merit selection [i.e., appointive] system,
not by the political process of nomination
and election ....
[This] would tend to point
to the merit selection system as the system
that provides opportunity rather than that of
the political process.57
5 6II Tr. at 132-137, 153 (Torres); II Tr. at 190-92
(Spigner).
5 7 II Tr. at 137. In addition, Terri Austin, an attorney and
member of the board of the Metropolitan Black Bar Association,
testified at our hearings on behalf of that organization. Ms.
Austin criticized the present performance of appointive systems
in appointing blacks and other minorities to the bench in New
York City, but concluded that either an appointive or an elective
system could be designed to rectify this problem.
II Tr. at 93,
104-106. Ms. Austin also strongly recommended that judicial
nominating conventions be abolished.
II Tr. at 96-97.
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Indeed, at least one of the current appointive
committees in New York State -- the Mayor's Committee on the
Judiciary in New York City -- appoints to the bench a relatively
high percentage of the female and minority candidates who apply,
although these groups are underrepresented in the applicant pool
itself .58

Nationwide studies also show that appointive systems

are more sensitive to the aspirations of minority groups and
women than are elective systems.59

Accordingly, the persistent

58of the appointive systems we surveyed on this point, the
Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary provided us with the most
extensive data for assessing its efficacy in placing women and
minority groups on the bench. During the years 1978-87,
minorities (male and female) comprised 10.7 percent of the total
applicants seeking appointment by the Mayor's Committee to
Criminal or Family Court: of these applicants, 44.9 percent were
approved by the Committee and ultimately 59.1 percent of those
approved were appointed by Mayor Koch to Criminal or Family
Court. Non-minorities (male and female) comprised 89.3 percent
of the total applicants: of these, 34 percent were approved and
40.8 percent of those approved were appointed.
(By letter dated
February 24, 1988 from Committee Chair David G. Trager).

59Results of a nationwide study undertaken in 1985 indicate
that a higher percentage of women and minorities were selected to
be judges in state courts through some type of appointive process
than through partisan or nonpartisan elections. The Success Of
Women And Minorities In Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection
Process, 69 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1985). According to
M.L. Henry, Jr., the Executive Director of the Fund for Modern
Courts, who testified at our hearings, these results have not
been contradicted in the two years since the study was published.
II Tr. at 230. The fact that women and blacks have done
considerably better under appointive systems nationwide was
corroborated by the hearing testimony of Frances Zemans, the
Executive Director of the American Judicature Society.
I Tr. at
235.
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underrepresentation of such groups in the judiciary does not of
itself argue in favor of elective systems.

3.

Community Values And Common Sense
The notion that judges should have a feel for their

community and empathy with the practical needs of those who
appear before them is compelling.

However, we are not persuaded

that near-exclusive recruitment of judges from political ranks is
the best way to foster community awareness and common sense on
the bench.

Political service in a club or county headquarters is

only one of many ways in which judicial candidates can acquire
these traits, and a proper method of judicial selection should be
open to qualified candidates from all backgrounds.

More important, the need for judges with experience
and sensitivity of this kind can and should be satisfied without
compromising judicial independence.

When individuals ascend to

the bench their break with politics should be complete, even as
they carry the lessons of their practical experience with them.

D.

Conclusion: The Conflict Between Partisan
Politics And Judicial Values
The Commission's investigation has necessarily focused

on specific illustrations of judicial election processes in New
York State.

Our investigation persuades us, however, that the

conflict between party politics, on the one hand, and judicial

Judicial Selection Report
May 19, 1988
Page 45
independence and nonpartisanship, on the other, is not peculiar
to any of the local elective systems examined in this report. 60
Rather, this conflict is inherent in the partisan nature of party
activity and political elections.

As our investigation shows,

political parties are geared to reward loyalty, not merit; to
discourage, not encourage, independence and diversity; and to
obtain power rather than promote justice.

Such goals, however

valuable to the operation of the party system in general, have no
place in the selection of our judges.

We therefore conclude that the selection of judges
should be removed as much as possible from the control of
political parties.

We further conclude that, to achieve this

result, judicial elections should be eliminated.
considered, and rejected, partisan elections.

We have already

Even nonpartisan

elections -- in which each candidate's name appears on the ballot
without party designation

are inadequate.

In the states

where they have been used to select judges, the same defects that
afflict partisan elections often manifest themselves:

heavy

reliance on campaign contributions; low voter identification with
candidates; and the decisive influence of party affiliations,
notwithstanding the absence of such information from the

60rn particular, this conflict is not peculiar to Queens
County. While Queens has served as an illustration in our
report, its elective systems are not atypical of those in other
areas of New York State.
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ballot.61

We therefore recommend an appointive method for the

selection of Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of
limited jurisdiction.

61M. Comisky and P. Patterson, The Judiciary - Selection,
Compensation, Ethics and Discipline, 9-10 (1987).
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III.

Appointive Systems

In this section we first briefly describe, by way of
background, the forms of appointive systems currently in place in
New York State.

We then discuss the general principles that an

appointive system should embody in order best to promote judicial
independence and the broadest possible access to the bench.
Finally, drawing on these general principles, we put forward our
recommendations for the preferred method of appointing judges.

A.

Types Of Appointive Systems
Judges in New York State are appointed either through a

screening or a nominating process.

In each process, an appointed

committee evaluates candidates and makes recommendations to the
executive vested with the appointing authority.

But whereas

nominating commissions recommend only a limited number of the
most highly qualified candidates, screening committees recommend
all well-qualified candidates, which normally results in a larger
pool of candidates from which the executive must choose.

1.

Nominating Processes
Two different nominating systems are in place in New

York State:

the State

Commi~sion

on Judicial Nomination (the

''Nominating Commission"), which nominates seven candidates for
Chief Judge and between three and seven candidates for Associate
Judge to the Governor for possible appointment to the Court of
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Appeals; and the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary (the "Mayor's
committee") in New York City, which nominates three persons for
each vacancy to the Mayor for possible appointment to the Family
and Criminal Courts and to Civil Court on an interim basis only.
The Nominating Commission has both a constitutional and a
statutory mandate,62 while the Mayor's Committee exists by
Mayoral Executive Order only.63

The Nominating Commission consists of 12 persons who
reside in the state and serve four-year staggered terms:

the

Governor selects four (two from each party and two of whom may
not be members of the bar), the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals selects four (two from each party and two of whom may not
be members of the bar), and the Speaker of the New York State
Assembly, the Temporary President of the State Senate and the
Minority Leaders of both the Assembly and the Senate each select
one.

The Commission members select their Chair from among their

ranks. 64

The Mayor's Committee is comprised of 27 persons, all
62N.Y. Const. art. VI, section 2; N.Y. Jud. Law, sections
61-68 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
63Exec. Order No. 10, dated April 11, 1978, as amended by
Exec. Order No. 87, dated December 6, 1985.
64N.Y. Const. art. VI, section 2; N.Y. Jud. Law, supra,
section 62.
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of whom the Mayor appoints.

The Mayor appoints 13 members

without nominations and receives nominations for the remaining 14
positions:

six each by the Presiding Justices of the Appellate

Division for the First and Second Judicial Departments, and
nominations of one each by the deans of two New York City law
schools (on an annual rotation basis).
the Committee Chair.

The Mayor also appoints

All of the Committee members must reside or

have their principal place of business in New York City. 6 5

The Mayor's Committee also re-evaluates each appointed
judge toward the end of his or her term.

If the Mayor's

Committee approves the judge for re-appointment, the Mayor
automatically re-appoints the judge; if the Mayor's Committee
fails to approve the judge, the Mayor denies re-appointment.66

2.

Screening Processes
By Executive Order, the Governor has established

screening committees in the four judicial departments across the
state to recommend candidates for appointment to the Appellate
Divisions and for appointment to the Supreme Court on an interim
basis.

In addition, the Executive Order provides for a State

Judicial Screening Committee to recommend candidates for
65Exec. Order No. 87, supra.
66see Procedure and Policy of the Mayor's Committee on the
Judiciary, Section 14, adopted March 2, 1978.
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appointment to the Court of Claims, and County Judicial Screening
Committees to recommend candidates for appointment to interim
vacancies on the Family Court outside of New York City, the
County Court and the Surrogate's Court.67

Each Departmental Screening Committee consists of nine
members:

four selected by the Governor, two by the Chief Judge

of the Court of Appeals, one by the Presiding Justice of the
Appellate Division of the relevant department, and two
collectively by the Speaker of the Assembly, the Temporary
President of the Senate, and the Minority Leaders of the Senate
and Assembly.

The State Judicial Screening Committee consists of

the Chairs of each of the Departmental Judicial Screening
Committees (appointed by the Governor from among the Committee
members) and two other members selected by the Governor from
each Departmental Screening Committee.

Finally, each County

Judicial Screening Committee consists of the members of the
Departmental Judicial Screening Committee for the relevant county
and one additional person selected by the chief executive officer
of the relevant county.68

Committee members must reside or work

in the judicial department or county in which they are to serve.

67Exec. Order No. 9, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. section 4.9 (March 4,
1983).
68rd.
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B.

General Principles For An Appointive System
Appointive systems, like elective systems, are exposed

to politics at several levels:

the selection of members of the

nominating commission or screening committee; the choice of
nominees; and finally the executive's appointment from among the
nominees.

However, it is possible to design appointive systems

that minimize political influence because, unlike elective
systems, they can be removed from both the control of party
organizations and the pressures of election campaigns.

For

these reasons, appointive systems can better achieve the goals of
protecting the independence of the judiciary and promoting fair
access to the bench by the broadest possible pool of qualified
candidates.69

A proper appointive system can promote judicial
independence by minimizing political pressures on judges.
Judicial appointment of course eliminates the concern with
campaign fundraising.

Moreover, by narrowing if not eliminating

the discretionary power of party leaders over judgeships,
appointment also undercuts the need to cultivate ties with and
maintain the favor of local party organizations.

In any system

in which a judge's selection depends in whole or in part on the
6 9 Thus, it may be no coincidence that, of the more than 30
states that over the past 35 years have replaced their elective
systems in whole or in part with appointive systems, none has
reverted to elections. The nationwide trend is unmistakably
toward appointive systems. See I Tr. at 233-34 (Zemans).
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actions of political officials, that fact may affect a judge's
perception of his or her role.

An appointive process, however,

can remove at least the most direct pressures -- those that stem
from the elected judge's perceived debt to the political party
leader.

To the extent that the appointment process wrests
control over judgeships from political leaders, it also opens
judicial positions to qualified candidates who are otherwise
excluded because of their lack of political party service or
clout.

Once potential candidates know that they do not need a

political connection to be considered seriously by a screening or
nominating committee and to obtain appointment to the bench, the
appointive process should be able to attract a broader pool of
well-qualified candidates than any elective system.70

In order best to realize these advantages an appointive
system should, in our judgment, embody the principles that are
set forth below.
70Indeed, several witnesses testified at the hearings that,
to the extent statistical evidence exists, it supports the
proposition that, in New York and across the nation, appointive
processes attract a more diverse pool of judicial candidates
than do elective processes. See testimony of Frances Zemans,
Executive Director of the American Judicature Society (I Tr. at
238-39), Robert Kaufman, President of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (I Tr. at 266), Anthony Palermo, Chair of
the Fourth Department Screening Committee (II Tr. at 258-60, 27374) and M.L. Henry, Jr., Executive Director of the Fund for
Modern Courts (II Tr. at 267-69).
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1.

An Appointive System Should Significantly
Constrain Executive Discretion Over Appointments
An appointive system should constrain executive

discretion over appointments by restricting the number of
nominees from which the executive must choose.

After all, the

appointing executive may be as politically motivated as a party
organization leader.

For this reason, a nominating process, in

which the executive must choose from among a small number of the
best candidates, is preferable to a screening process, which
allows the executive to choose from a potentially unlimited
number of candidates.

Limiting the number of nominees from which

the executive must choose also helps foster judicial independence
by increasing the role of the commission and, in that way,
reducing the debt that a successful nominee might feel toward the
executive who appointed him or her.

The screening process, to be sure, has the merit of
limiting nominees to exactly the number of candidates found wellqualified.

However, under a nominating system the problem of

including unqualified candidates can be addressed by requiring
the commission to nominate only those candidates who are found to
be well-qualified.
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2.

The Composition Of The Nominating Commission Should
Reflect A Broad Spectrum Of Community Interests
The nominating commission itself should be multi-

partisan, if not nonpartisan, and broadly representative of the
demographic make-up of the community served.

These features

broaden access to judicial office by ensuring that nominations
are the result of a cross-section of views.

Moreover, they work

to minimize the intrusion of party politics by neutralizing the
power of any one faction within the commission, and by lessening
the likelihood that the commission will come under the sway of
the executive.

A broad spectrum of represented interests also

rebuts what is perhaps the most common allegation against
appointive processes, namely that they are "elitist" and mirror
the preferences of the established bar.

Accordingly, the members of each nominating commission
should be appointed, not by one central authority, but by a range
of government authorities appropriate to the community served.
Furthermore, there should be limits on the number of commission
members who belong to any one political party or who are members
of the bar.

And both commission members and the government

authorities responsible for appointing judges should be
officially charged with the goal of carrying out their duties in
a nonpartisan fashion.
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3.

The Nominating Commission System Should Be
Significantly Decentralized
A decentralized system of nominating commissions is

essential in order both to facilitate community involvement in
the selection of judges and to attract a diverse pool of
candidates.

Accordingly, each judicial district and other

relevant locale should have a nominating commission, and a
portion of its members should be selected by local political
officials.

Moreover, all of the members of each commission

should reside or work in the geographical area it serves.

Each

commission should also actively recruit qualified judicial
candidates from all segments of the relevant community.

Toward this same end, the authority for the selection
of judges should also be decentralized.

In contrast to most

current court reform proposals for New York State, which lodge
the power of appointment almost exclusively with the Governor,71
we prefer that the Governor's appointment power be restricted to
a few courts and that appropriate local authorities, such as the
mayor or county executive, appoint judges to most local courts.

71see, ~, the Governor's Program Bill No. 186,
S.8246/A.9939, 211th Session (1988) ("Governor's Program's
Program Bill No. 186 11 ) . This bill gives exclusive appointment
power to the Governor -- except for certain Mayoral appointments
in New York City -- in the context of court merger, which would
consolidate various trial courts into a single court system.
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4.

Sitting Judges Should Not Have To
Face Re-election
In light of our investigation of elective systems, it

is imperative that judges not have to face the sometimes chilling
prospect of securing political support or financial resources for
their re-election.

The appointive system should therefore

provide. for the automatic retention of an incumbent judge for a
new term upon a finding by the nominating commission, in the last
year of his or her current term, that the judge has served
competently and with integrity.

This feature is preferable to

requiring, as do some appointive proposals, that judges seeking
re-election submit to an uncontested retention election.72

This

referendum-like feature unnecessarily exposes sitting judges to
what Chief Judge Wachtler termed "the inherent danger" that even
uncontested judicial elections will be unduly politicized.73

5.

The Work Of The Nominating Commission Should
Be Subject To Public Scrutiny
Finally, some public scrutiny of the work of the

nominating commission is essential to help ensure that it
operates fairly.

We realize that the identities of applicants,

72see, ~' Governor's Program Bill No. 186, supra,
section 12; Chief Judge's Proposal For Retention Election Of
Sitting Judges, S.8247/A.10791, 211th Session (1988), section 1.
73r Tr. at 21. Chief Judge Wachtler testified that
uncontested retention elections are preferable to the present
partisan elections, but that an appointive method is preferable
to both. See id. at 11-12, 21.
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the data collected concerning them and their evaluation by the
commission must remain confidential in order to encourage wellqualified candidates to apply and to protect their privacy.

But

the nominating commission should be required to maintain and
disclose statistical information on, for example, the numbers of
applicants, the numbers and percentages of minority group and
female applicants, and the numbers and percentages of minority
group and female applicants who are nominated and appointed. 74
Not compiling or disclosing such statistical information serves
no useful purpose and can only undermine public confidence in the
appointive process.

c.

Recommendations
The Commission recommends amending the New York State

Constitution to provide for an appointive system for the
selection of all Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of
limited jurisdiction.

We conclude that, in light of the

foregoing principles, the following seven features embody the
best appointive system for New York State:
1.

Nominating commissions for Supreme Court should be

7 4only the Mayor's Committee and the Screening Committee for
the First Department made available to the Commission such
information in meaningful detail. The other departmental and
statewide screening committees provided at most limited
statistical information, and the State Commission on Judicial
Nomination declined on grounds of confidentiality to provide the
Commission with any information beyond the names of the nominees
and appointees for each vacancy and the mailing list utilized to
seek applicants.
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established in each judicial district, and nominating commissions
for courts of limited jurisdiction should be established in the
appropriate geographical area.

These locales range in size from

the entire state (Court of Claims) to individual cities (City
Courts).75

2.

Members of each nominating commission should be

selected by a range of relevant government authorities.

In the

case of each nominating commission, four officials or groups of
officials should have the power to appoint roughly equal numbers
of commissioners:

the Governor; the four majority and minority

leaders of the State Senate and Assembly (with each leader
enjoying equal appointing power); the Chief Judge of the State of
New York and the Presiding Justice or Justices of the relevant
Appellate Division or Divisions (with the Presiding Justice or
Justices enjoying an appointing power roughly equal to that of
the Chief Judge); and officials from the relevant geographical
area, such as the mayor and/or county executive.

In all cases,

the commission members themselves should select the chair from
among their own ranks.
75 Many current court reform proposals include provisions for
court merger. See, ~' the Governor's Program Bill No. 186,
supra.
Court merger would greatly simplify the nominating
commission scheme by making the judicial district the sole
jurisdictional unit throughout the State. The Commission,
however, takes no position as to the merits of court merger,
since it raises issues that are outside the scope of our
Executive Order.
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3.

The authorities who appoint commission members

should be officially charged with the goal of achieving as broad
a range of community representation on the commission as
possible.

The commission members themselves should also be

charged with the goal of acting in a nonpartisan manner in
carrying out their duties.

In order to help ensure that these

goals are achieved, limits should be set on the number of
commission members who may belong to any one political party and
who may be members of the bar.

In addition, all of the

commission members should reside or work in the geographical
area that is served.

Commission members should also be barred

from holding any judicial or elected public office or any office
in a political party during their periods of service.

Moreover,

they should be ineligible for appointment to judicial off ice
during a prescribed period after their service on the commission.

4.

Each nominating commission should broadly and

promptly disseminate public notice of every judicial vacancy as
well as the procedures prospective candidates should follow.

In

addition, commission members should actively recruit prospective
candidates who appear to be qualified.

The commissions should

adopt written, uniform procedures for screening candidates and
evaluating candidates.
following elements.

These procedures should include the
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Each candidate should be required to submit a
questionnaire detailing his or her personal and professional
background and qualifications.

Counsel to the commission and a

subcommittee designated by the chair should preliminarily screen
candidates by reviewing their questionnaires and conducting a
thorough investigation to obtain an accurate view of the
candidate's integrity, professional competence and probable
judicial temperament.

This investigation should include

contacting as many individuals and institutions as is deemed
necessary.

counsel should then prepare a written report of the

investigation of each screened candidate and submit it along with
the questionnaire to the full commission for review.

The chair

should then convene commission meetings to discuss the
questionnaires and reports and to interview each screened
candidate.

Following this interview, the members should discuss
the merits of the candidates and then vote, ranking the
candidates in order of preference and determining whether they
are well-qualified or not.

This vote should be conducted openly

within the commission, to minimize the risk of partisan or other
unfair forms of voting.

Commission members should vote only for

as many candidates as there are potential nominees.

For each

vacancy, the commission should nominate a small number of
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candidates, provided each has been found well-qualified by a
majority of the commission members.76

5.

The executive vested with the authority to

appoint judges should vary depending on the nature and
jurisdiction of the court.

The Governor should appoint nominees

to the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims, both of which are
courts with statewide jurisdiction.

The Governor, in our view,

should also appoint nominees to the Surrogate's Court, because of
the extraordinary powers of the judges on that court.

The

Governor's power of appointment should be subject to confirmation
by the State Senate.

The relevant mayor should appoint judges to

City Courts, to Family Courts in New York City, and to Civil and
Criminal Courts (which exist only in New York City).

The

relevant county executive should appoint judges to County and
District Courts and to Family Courts outside of New York City.
Each appointing executive must make his or her appointment from
the list of nominees within a prescribed period of time.

Each

appointing executive should also be officially charged with the
goal of acting in a strictly nonpartisan manner in making
judicial appointments.

7 6rn most proposals, the number of nominees for one vacancy
ranges from three to five, with an additional two nominees for
each additional vacancy in cases of multiple vacancies.
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6.

If an incumbent judge seeks re-appointment, the

judge must so inform the commission in the last year of his or
her term.

Following a process of investigation and interview

similar to what has already been described, the commission
· members must decide by majority vote whether the incumbent judge
is qualified to serve another term.

If so, re-appointment

should be automatic.

7.

Each nominating commission should be subject to

certain confidentiality provisions.

However, each commission

should also be required to compile, maintain and make publicly
available statistical information on applicants, nominees and
appointees, including the number of applicants, the numbers and
percentages of minority group and female applicants, and the
numbers and percentages of minority group and female applicants
who are nominated and appointed.

*

*

*

We urge these recommendations because, in our judgment,
they are best calculated to preserve the independence of the
judiciary and justify public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system.

In considering the selection of our judges,

nothing less than the best possible method will suffice.

We
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expect much of judges:

independence, courage, honesty, ability,

knowledge, understanding and compassion.

Accordingly, it is

imperative that we have the best and most qualified people
serving on the bench.

Our recommendations have been designed to

achieve that end.
Dated:

New York, New York
May 19, 1988
STATE OF NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY

John D. Feerick
Chairman
Richard D. Emery
Patricia M. Hynes
James L. Magavern
Bernard s. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyrus R. Vance
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Witnesses Testifying and Documents Submitted
at the Public Hearings of the
New York State Commission on Government Integrity
in New York, New York
March 3 and 9, 1988
March 3rd Witnesses
Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge, State of New York
(Transcript pages 7-44).
Malcolm Wilson, Former Governor, State of New York
(pages 44-79) .
Saul Weprin, Member, New York State Assembly (pages 80150) .
Donald Sullivan, Former Justice, Supreme Court of the
State of New York (pages 151-181).
Joan Carey, Judge, New York State Court of Claims
(pages 181-215).
Joseph Bermingham, President, Erie County Bar
Association (participant in panel discussion, pages 216-270).
Robert Kaufman, President, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (participant in panel discussion, pages 216270) .
Frances Zemans, Vice President and Executive Director,
American Judicature Society (participant in panel discussion,
pages 216-270).
March 9th Witnesses
Nat Hentel, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New
York (Transcript pages 4-46).
David Levy, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New
York (pages 46-92).
Terri Austin, Member, Board of Directors of the
Metropolitan Black Bar Association (pages 93-106).
Robert Levinsohn, Co-Cha i r, Law Committee of the New
York County Democratic Committee (pages 106-129).
Frank Torres, Justice, Supreme Court of the State of
New York (pages 129-160) .
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Archie Spigner, Member, New York City Council (pages
161-202) .
Stuart Namm, Judge, New York State County Court (pages
2 02-224) .
M.L. Henry, Jr., Executive Director, Fund for Modern
Courts (participant in panel discussion, pages 225-313).
David Trager, Chair, Mayor's Committee on the
Judiciary, City of New York (participant in panel discussion,
pages 225-313).
Anthony Palermo, Chair, Fourth Department Screening
Committee (participant in panel discussion, pages 225-313).
Documents Submitted
Statements by the witnesses.

